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vABSTRACT 
During recent campaigns in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, increased 
emphasis has been placed on Close Air Support (CAS) for forces conducting 
unconventional operations with small, specialized units as well as conventional 
operations at the brigade or division level.  Because of the proximity to friendly 
troops, the need for successful integration of forces during CAS missions is 
critical.  The effectiveness of the joint forces conducting Joint Close Air Support 
(JCAS) can be measured by the success or failure of the Command and Control 
(C2) process.  Situations often occur in which forward air controllers (FACs) from 
one service integrate into the structure of another service, yet still report to their 
own leadership.  Many non-interoperable communications systems are used, 
further adding to the confusion.   
This thesis analyzes the effectiveness of current Joint Close Air Support 
doctrine in providing the guidelines necessary for the warfighter at all echelons to 
plan, prepare and execute integrated close air support missions seamlessly 
when operating in a joint environment.  Themes which hamper the ability to 
efficiently employ command and control (C2) to provide close air support to the 
Ground Combat Commander are examined.  Finally, Naval Surface Fire Support 
is studied to determine its place in the JCAS architecture and where, within that 
architecture, it should be implemented. 
The analysis of case studies involving situations in which JCAS was not 
used effectively revealed that, though there has been significant progress made 
in revising Joint CAS doctrine, weaknesses still exist. Joint doctrine must keep 
pace with emerging technology but for that doctrine to remain relevant, 
warfighters at all levels must know it, use it and provide feedback when it doesn’t 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A.  OVERVIEW .......................................................................................... 1 
B. BACKGROUND ................................................................................... 1 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT................. 3 
D. METHODOLOGY................................................................................. 5 
E. ORGANIZATION.................................................................................. 5 
II. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT .................................................................................. 7 
A.  HISTORY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT................................................. 7 
1.  World War I............................................................................... 7 
2.   Inter-War Period....................................................................... 8 
3. World War II.............................................................................. 9 
4. Korea ...................................................................................... 11 
5.    Vietnam................................................................................... 13 
6. Modern Conflicts ................................................................... 14 
7.   Future of Close Air Support.................................................. 15 
B. SERVICE DOCTRINE........................................................................ 16 
1.  Army/Air Force Doctrine ....................................................... 17 
2. Navy/Marine Corps Doctrine................................................. 19 
3.  Special Operations Forces Doctrine .................................... 21 
C. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................. 22 
III. ANALYSIS OF JCAS ................................................................................... 25 
A. CASE STUDIES................................................................................. 27 
1. Incident on the Djakovica-Prizren Road, Kosovo on 14 
April 1999................................................................................ 27 
2. Incident in the Shahikot Valley, Afghanistan on 2 March 
2002......................................................................................... 30 
3. Incident near An Nasiriyah, Iraq on 23 March 2003 ............ 35 
B. UPDATE OF JP 3-09.3 ...................................................................... 39 
C. DOCTRINAL PROBLEMS ................................................................. 44 
D. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 48 
IV. FUTURE WEAPONS AND INTEGRATION OF NSFS INTO JCAS ............. 51 
A. NSFS WEAPONS SYSTEMS ............................................................ 53 
B. OUTLOOK FOR NAVAL WEAPONS INTEGRATION INTO JCAS... 58 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................. 61 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 65 



























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Army/Air Force CAS Connectivity (From JP 3.09-3)........................... 17 
Figure 2. Navy/Marine Corps CAS Connectivity (From JP 3-09.3) .................... 20 
Figure 3. Special Operations CAS Connectivity (From JP 3-09.3) .................... 22 
Figure 4. Deconfliction of the JCAS Battlespace (From NTAMD CONOPS 
Brief)................................................................................................... 25 




























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank the following individuals for their help and support: 
 
I want to thank Professor Dan C. Boger and Lieutenant Colonel Karl D. 
Pfeiffer for their time and patience as my thesis advisors. Their guidance, 
mentorship, and wisdom throughout the development of this thesis were 
absolutely critical.   
 
I would also like to thank my family and friends for their support throughout 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
1I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  OVERVIEW 
During recent campaigns in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, increased 
emphasis has been placed on Close Air Support (CAS) for forces conducting 
unconventional operations with small, specialized units as well as conventional 
operations at the brigade or division level.  Because of the proximity to friendly 
troops, the need for successful integration of forces during CAS missions is 
critical.  The effectiveness of the joint forces conducting Joint Close Air Support 
(JCAS) can be measured by the success or failure of the Command and Control 
(C2) process.  Situations often occur in which forward air controllers (FACs) from 
one service integrate into the structure of another service, yet still report to their 
own leadership.  Many non-interoperable communications systems are used, 
further adding to the confusion.   
Recent studies have been conducted on CAS and the need for integrated 
training and updated doctrine.  This thesis will focus on these studies and provide 
recommendations for a standardized JCAS architecture as well as ways in which 
to integrate naval surface fire support into this architecture.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Close Air Support has long been used as a counterland mission of U.S. 
forces.  Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised the visibility of the 
effects of Close Air Support in modern warfare.1  The need for detailed 
integration to strike the correct targets while avoiding fratricide is what sets Close 
Air Support apart from other counterland missions.2  One of the main problems 
with integrating CAS is the difference in something as simple as the definition.  
Joint Publication 3-09.3 defines CAS as: 
air action by fixed and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets 
which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require 
                                            
1 Bruce R. Pirnie, et al. Beyond Close Air Support : Forging a New Air Ground Partnership.  
(California: RAND Corporation, 2005)  3. 
2 Ibid, 12. 
2detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement 
of those forces. 
Air Force Manual 1-1, “Basic Aerospace Doctrine, states:  
Close air support is the application of aerospace forces in support 
of the land component commander’s objectives.  Since it provides 
direct support to friendly forces in contact, close air support 
requires close coordination from the theater and component levels 
to the tactical level operations. Close air support produces the most 
focused and briefest effect of any force application mission; 
consequently, close air support rarely creates campaign-level 
effects.   
Army Field Manual 100-5, “Operations,” defines CAS as:  
missions supporting land operations by attacking hostile targets 
close to friendly ground forces. CAS can support offensive 
operations by attacking hostile targets close to friendly ground 
forces. CAS can also support offensive operations with preplanned 
or immediate attacks. All preplanned and immediate CAS missions 
require timely intelligence information. CAS missions require 
positive identification of friendly forces [to prevent fratricide] and 
positive control of aircraft [to attack enemy forces]. 
The Marine Corps’ FMFM 5-41, “Close Air Support,” states that:  
the commander uses CAS at the decisive place and time to achieve 
local combat superiority or to take advantage of battlefield 
opportunities. An aircraft’s three-dimensional mobility and speed 
provide the commander with a means to strike the enemy swiftly 
and unexpectedly. Proper planning and timely communication and 
control are necessary if the aircrew is to be successful.   
Joint Pub 3-09.3, “Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support” 
identifies the Navy’s role in CAS as:  
the support of amphibious and land operations with massed 
firepower, requiring detailed integration with the ground scheme of 
maneuver.  CAS requires close coordination during tasking, 
planning and execution.  CAS is a force multiplier, enabling the 
supported commander to mass combat power decisively.  
Traditionally, the Navy has been a provider of CAS, but can be a 
recipient of CAS as well, in support of Naval operations. 
Finally, JP 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations” acknowledges CAS’s 
role in SOF by stating: 
3Air Force SOF AC-130’s train extensively for CAS in support of 
special operations direct action mission.  Also, AC-130’s may 
provide CAS in support of other component commanders.  Special 
operations helicopters provide limited CAS to SOF land and 
maritime units.  
Each definition is unique and tailored to its specific service yet they are all 
similar.  The common thread in the definitions is that each acknowledges the 
importance of detailed integration and prior planning and each deal with air 
forces applying combat power to targets in close proximity to friendly forces. 
Even though the definitions have similarities, there still exists confusion 
and differences among the services when discussing what exactly close air 
support constitutes.  When the United States prosecuted Operation Allied Force 
in Kosovo, counterland attacks were termed CAS even though there were no 
friendly forces on the ground because the procedures used were most similar to 
those normally used for CAS.3  The meaning of words like “proximity”, “close” 
and “support” come into question when services are brought together for the first 
time in battle.  Does their presence in the definition mean that CAS can only be 
provided when targets are “in proximity” to friendly forces?  To take it one step 
further, how close is “close”?  Does the word “support” imply a one-sided 
relationship?  These are some of the details the services have disagreed about 
since Close Air Support was first used by the United States in the closing battles 
of World War I and the discussion continues into today’s battles in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT  
This thesis will address the following research questions: 
— Does JP 3-09.3 “Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air 
Support” provide the required guidelines to build the operational architecture 
necessary for effective CAS? 
— What are the enduring themes that hamper our ability to effectively 
and efficiently employ Command and Control (C2) to provide close air support in 
support of the Ground Combat Commander? 
                                            
3 Pirnie,  44. 
4— How does Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) support JCAS and in 
which phases of JCAS would NSFS best fit?  Once we figure out Naval Surface 
Fire Support’s place in the JCAS architecture, how do we integrate it? 
Close Air Support exemplifies “joint” at a tactical level, and lack of 
adherence to doctrine, confusion with C2 architecture and radio circuits and 
reluctance to impose the discipline of joint tactics, techniques and procedures 
leads to ineffective use of this highly versatile arm of U.S. air power.4  Recent 
U.S. involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq has shown both successes 
and failures in the use of Joint Close Air Support.  The battlefield has changed 
and we are no longer employing tactics of conventional warfare.  Smaller, 
specialized units are being employed for military operations that have 
increasingly assumed the character of counterinsurgency mingled with 
counterterrorism.5  Technological advances have increased the tempo of 
operations and doctrine is not keeping up.   
The June 2004 Mission Area Initial Capabilities Document for Close Air 
Support, drafted by the Marine Corps stated that “the services’ doctrine on Close 
Air Support has not kept pace with joint doctrine.  Close Air Support phases of 
planning, preparation and execution evolved from Joint and Service doctrine but 
a common thread is lacking between the service and joint pubs.”6   
This thesis will examine case studies in the use of Close Air Support from 
recent conflicts and attempt to determine which doctrine, if any, was followed, 
assess the outcome and draw conclusions as to how doctrine might have been 
integrated more effectively.  The thesis will also examine Naval Surface Fire 
Support and the role it may play in the future of Close Air Support and how it can 
be integrated into improved Joint Close Air Support doctrine. 
 
                                            
4 John M. Jansen, et al.  “ The Tower of Babel: Joint Close Air Support Performance at the 
Operational Level.” Marine Corps Gazette. (March 2003), 33-39. 
5 Pirnie, 32. 
6 United States.  JROCM 095-04. Mission Area Initial Capabilities Document For Close Air 
Support. (Washington: GPO, 2004), 12. 
 
5D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will answer the primary research questions by focusing on 
recent studies published by Joint Forces Command, the General Accounting 
Office and others citing the need for improved joint close air support doctrine and 
procedures.  Case studies, after-action reports and lessons learned from recent 
conflicts in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan will be used to highlight differences in 
tactics and procedures implemented by the different services.  Current service-
specific close air support doctrine will be examined to identify gaps in joint 
doctrine to support or reject the premise that current joint doctrine is not sufficient 
for successful integration of forces during close air support to fight the types of 
urban and “unconventional” battles with which our modern military is faced today.  
Finally, Naval Surface Fire Support will be examined with respect to Close Air 
Support to assess where this combat power can be integrated into Joint Close 
Air Support architecture. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II will examine the history of Close Air Support from its inception 
in World War I to the current battles in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This study will 
place an emphasis on the need for integrated Close Air Support throughout the 
past 100 years.  Chapter II will next look to the future and outline the importance 
of Joint Close Air Support in the unconventional warfare that will be waged in the 
coming years.  The vision of the military put forth by the National Military Strategy 
emphasizes full integration, agility and decisiveness.  The final section of Chapter 
II will examine service doctrine.  It will identify the Close Air Support role in each 
service, the procedure for processing Close Air Support and the methods each 
uses to coordinate support and establish airspace control measures.  Chapter II 
will conclude with a discussion of the similarities and differences between the 
service doctrines. 
Chapter III will provide an analysis of Joint Close Air Support by examining 
case studies of incidents in which CAS was employed ineffectively, resulting in 
fratricide or the targeting of non-combatants.  These case studies using practices 
employed in the field will be used as a baseline to determine which doctrine was 
6being followed when the incidents occurred, service or joint, and investigate 
whether that doctrine was sufficient guidance for the effective use of Close Air 
Support.  Once that determination is made, recommendations will be made about 
the actions needed for current joint doctrine to provide the required guidelines to 
build the operational architecture necessary for effective Close Air Support.  This 
chapter will argue that though the doctrine used by the elements involved in the 
incidents may have been sufficient, JP 3-09.3 was insufficient guidance for forces 
operating in a joint environment.  Chapter III will also examine JFCOM’s role in 
the development of Joint Close Air Support Doctrine and summarize the changes 
made in the September 2005 revision of JP 3-09.3 and provide an analysis of the 
differences between the 2005 revision and the original 1995 version.  Chapter III 
will conclude by identifying gaps and shortfalls in current joint doctrine. 
Chapter IV will focus on the surface Navy’s contribution to the Joint Close 
Air Support mission.  The type of conflict in which Naval Surface Fire Support is 
most effective will be examined and it will be argued that there is a place in the 
Joint Close Air Support architecture for certain elements of NSFS.  Advantages 
and capabilities of specific surface platforms for the employment of CAS will be 
outlined.  Future weapons integration into Joint Close Air Support will be studied, 
including the use of Tactical Tomahawk, Extended Range Guided Munitions 
(ERGMs), Electric Rail Guns and UAVs.  The chapter will conclude by looking 
ahead to future surface ships such as DD(X), CG(X) and LCS to determine if 
NSFS will have a role in the Joint Close Air Support mission.   
Finally, Chapter V will provide a summary and discuss further avenues of 





7II. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 
When asked where the commander of the 3d Attack Group was 
getting his doctrine, Partridge replied “he was manufacturing it.” 
       
     - Interview with General Partridge, USAF, 1974 
 
Using aircraft in support of troops on the ground has been a vision of 
military commanders since the late 19th century.  In 1893 Count Ferdinand Von 
Zeppelin informed the Chief of Staff of the German army that the airship he was 
building would have the capability to attack fortifications and troop 
concentrations.7  Zeppelin would go on to build twenty-one Zeppelin airships, 
fourteen of which he sold to the German Army and Navy.  Zeppelin airships were 
used for reconnaissance, scouting and bombing during the opening campaigns 
of WWI but did not achieve notable success.  Despite their range, speed and 
capacity, these airships were especially vulnerable to gunfire.8  Prior to World 
War I, aerial bombing was used successfully, though sparingly, by the Italians in 
the Italo-Turkish War as well by the Bulgarians in the Balkan Wars.9 Although 
these incidents were random and conducted because of the initiative of the 
aviators involved, they ignited an interest in the combat potential of air power 
which has evolved into Close Air Support (CAS) as we know it today. 
A.  HISTORY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 
1.  World War I 
Modern CAS can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century.  
Doctrine, tactics and combat aircraft all have roots in World War I.  The Great 
War introduced combat aircraft to the Western Front, the first bombing units and 
tactical reconnaissance aircraft.  In 1914, the British Royal Flying Corps 
                                            
7 Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung der Luftwaffe, Die Militariuftfahrt bis zum Beginn des 
Weltkrieges 1814, 3 Vols (Berlin, 1941), II. Cited by Franklin B. Cooling. Case Studies in the 
Development of Close Air Support. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1990, 13. 
8 “Zeppelin, Ferdinand, Graf von” Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia. 2004 ed. 
9 Franklin B. Cooling. Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. (Washington: 
GPO, 1990) 15. 
8endorsed the offensive use of aircraft in combat.  The French Army developed 
techniques for air-infantry cooperation in 1916 and the Germans made 
tremendous progress in 1917 by expanding the use of low-flying aircraft in battle, 
flying in battle formation and creating an air liaison to communicate between air 
and ground forces.   
The U.S. Army Air Corps debuted in battle in France in 1918, as CAS 
techniques continued to be refined by every country using aircraft in battle.  Air 
units began to follow elaborate air plans in major offenses.  The psychological 
impact of air attacks to ground troops was recognized and infantrymen were 
given the first written instruction about defense against aircraft in a 1918 German 
circular.  Finally, a distinction was made between direct CAS (used against 
targets along the front lines) and indirect CAS (used against targets twenty+ 
miles beyond the front) and the contribution of each to the effort of ground 
forces.10  The debate over which is more effective as the primary contribution of 
combat aircraft continues today. 
2.   Inter-War Period 
By the end of World War I, the contribution of CAS to the combat effort 
could not be denied.  The years between WWI and WWII were spent developing 
CAS doctrine, refining tactics and techniques in minor conflicts and 
experimenting with aircraft design against the backdrop of larger airpower 
development.   Combat experience by pilots of this era was limited and the 
primary role of military aircraft during the post-war period was maintaining order 
in the colonies of Britain, France and Spain.  The manufacture and importation of 
aircraft by Germany was officially banned by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 
(though the German military continued to develop aircraft underground.) The 
Russian air force was uprooted by revolution and civil war.  For a decade after 
the Great War, the development of CAS in Europe was seemingly at a standstill.  
As stalled as Close Air Support seemed to be across the Atlantic during 
the 1920’s, great strides were being made in the United States.  In 1921, the 3d 
Attack Group was created.  As the first organized attack group to form within the                                             
10 Cooling, 25. 
9Army Air Service, the 3d Attack Group was instrumental in developing close air 
support doctrine in the inter-war period. 11  The same year, Boeing built the Army’s 
first combat aircraft, the GA-1, a massive tri-plane with heavy armament and 
extensive armor protection. 12  Only ten were delivered and were used primarily 
as training aircraft.  As the 1920’s came to an end, the U.S. Marine Corps 
demonstrated the combat potential of CAS in Nicaragua.  There, Marine pilots 
were the first to use dive-bombing against an organized enemy, they were the 
first to employ air-to-ground communications in combat and they were the first to 
transport troops and supplies by air.13  The 1930’s was a time of trial and error 
for Close Air Support tactics with an emphasis placed on indirect attack in most 
countries.  Advances were made in the design of ground attack aircraft.  In the 
early part of the decade, Hitler took power in Germany, kicking off a rapid military 
expansion in that country including the introduction of the German Air Force, the 
Luftwaffe in 1935.  The Luftwaffe placed emphasis on interdiction and strategic 
bombing using a strategy of interservice cooperation that would go on to define 
Close Air Support in World War II. 
3. World War II 
World War II was marked by doctrinal disagreements over differing views 
of the battlefield and the role of air power in combat.  At the beginning of the war, 
strategic bombardment was the top priority of the U.S. Army Air Force (AAF) and 
Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) in Europe and close air support was not part of 
AAF doctrine.  In fact in 1941, AAF doctrine was not to attack targets within 
range of friendly artillery.14  After two years of war, the need for written guidance 
was recognized and in 1942, FM 31-35, “Aviation in Support of Ground Forces” 
                                            
 11 “Third Operations Group History,” Elemendorf AFB. 13 February 2006. 
<http://www.elmendorf.af.mil/3Wing/Groups/3OG/webdocs/HISTORY.htm>. Accessed March 
2006. 
12 “Military Aircraft.” Highgallery.Com. <http://www.highgallery.com/military-aircraft-ga-
1.html>.  Accessed March 2006. 
 13 Elizabeth Tierney. “A Brief History of Marine Corps Aviation.” Maxwell-Gunter AFB. 13 July 
1962. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmchist/aviation.txt>. Accessed March 2006. 
14 Christopher R. Gabel. “The US Army GHq Maneuvers of 1941” (Unpublished Ohio State 
University Ph D Dissertation, 1981), 65-67, 70-71, 97-99, 310-313. Cited by B. Franklin Cooling, 
Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, (Washington D.C., 1990), 157. 
10
was published.    This document led the way for further advances in joint close air 
support.  Later the same year, the first air support command, the U.S. 12th Air 
Force, was established in North Africa.  The 12th Air Force faced the same 
problems as most units that are newly implemented.  Their forces had never 
trained together before they went into battle and there was little thought given to 
the doctrinal problems of air forces supporting ground forces.  The Ground 
Commander controlled all support aircraft.15   
The Allied experience in North Africa emphasized the need for change in 
doctrine, the role of aircraft in close air support and command and control 
methods.  These experiences highlighted the need for centralized control of air 
forces.  The Allied victory in Tunisia proved that air superiority is a key to 
successful air support in combat.  In 1943, the Allied Air Support Command was 
established in response to General Eisenhower’s order that the Allied Air Forces 
set up an army support command headquarters collocated with the Allied Ground 
Forces to coordinate air-ground operations.  This was the “first step toward a 
‘centralized theater control of air’ resources.”16  A number of allied commands 
were established at this time including the Northwest African Tactical Air Force 
(NATAF), created specifically to support ground operations.   
NATAF made a change from 12th Air Force doctrine and gave control of 
support aircraft to the Air Commander.  This change highlighted an argument 
about the correct use of air power that continues today.  Ground Commanders 
viewed the primary role of air power as the support of ground troops.  Air 
Commanders viewed the primary role of air forces as gaining air superiority, 
interdiction and finally, close air support.  These priorities were implemented by 
NATAF and laid the doctrinal foundations for the Army’s FM 100-20, “Command 
and Employment of Air Power,” published in 1943, which is the basis of modern 
tactical air doctrine.  As the war continued, the experiences between 1943 and 
1945 brought about a call to create Joint Close Air Support doctrine.   
                                            
15 Cooling, 155-157. 
16 Ibid, 168. 
11
Amphibious assaults in Italy and Sicily did much to shape the close air 
support system.  Daily meetings were conducted by air and ground leaders to 
discuss strategy and choose targets for the following day.  Close liaison was 
provided between Army and Tactical Air Commands, maintaining centralized 
control over air assets.  During Operation Overlord in Normandy, once air 
supremacy was achieved, close air support was provided on a scale previously 
unknown and played a decisive role in the Allied victory in France.  Visible close 
air support raised morale of Allied troops and had adverse effects on the morale 
of the enemy as well as reducing their effectiveness by disrupting 
communication, cohesion and organization.  Problems associated with close air 
support were identified.  Pilots had difficulty identifying targets and handling 
requests for prearranged support.  Communications lacked reliability.  The air 
staff was too small to keep track of both ground and air operations and there was 
a lack of qualified personnel.17  
In the Pacific, similar lessons were being learned.  Air superiority was an 
absolute requirement and close air support was used well against Japanese lines 
of communication.  Heavy bombers were useful because of their long range.  A 
problem that was not experienced in Europe and had to be overcome was the 
use of kamikaze pilots.  They were more effective for the Japanese than 
conventional tactics, making interdiction a priority.  It became extremely 
important for Allied air forces to destroy them on their bases, before they got into 
the air.  The ability to learn from combined experiences in the Pacific and 
European theaters of war contributed to the momentum of the Allies.  By the end 
of 1944 an effective command and control had developed at all levels, joint and 
combined.   
4. Korea 
Based on the experiences of the experiences of the Allies in northern 
Europe the Army refined FM 31-35 “Air-Ground Operations” in 1946 and 
reiterated the necessity for land power and air power to be equal, the tactical air 
commander and the ground commander to be collocated in a Joint Operations 
                                            
17 Cooling, 264-268. 
12
Center (JOC) and have both commanders answer to a theater commander, who 
would retain absolute authority over all forces.18 The effectiveness of the Army 
Air Corps in World War II emphasized the need for an independent air branch of 
the armed services.   
In 1947, the Air Force became an individual service.  Between 1947 and 
1950, eight major joint tactical air exercises were conducted in the United 
States.19 The publication of the “Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground 
Operations” resulted from the training exercises in an effort to standardize 
procedures for interservice utilization of air support.  Steps were made in the 
advancement of close air support during the Korean War.  Feedback from the 
Air-Ground Operations Conference of 1953 showed that the Joint Operations 
Center (JOC) functioned well.  Operations during adverse weather and night-time 
were improved by the use of electronic indirect guidance.  Jet aircraft were 
introduced and were proven just as accurate as propeller-driven fighter 
bombers.20 
At the start of the war in Korea, there was very little inter-service 
cooperation and there were acute differences between the way the Air Force and 
the Marine Corps perceived air support.  The Air Force preferred interdiction over 
close air support as the primary weapon against ground forces while the Marine 
Corps emphasized the need for close air support to ground forces if they were 
going to maintain momentum.  Out of all air sorties flown, seventy-five percent of 
those were flown by the Air Force.  Close Air Support made up only ten to fifteen 
percent of those sorties, with the Navy and Marine Corps requesting almost all of 
them.21  Senior officers in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps proposed changes 
to the air request/air control system while the leadership in the Air Force thought 
ground forces had no idea how to effectively use air power.   
                                            
18 Cooling, 347. 
19 Ibid, 349. 
20 Ibid, 394. 
21 Ibid, 395. 
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The experiences by all U.S. forces widened the gap in the services’ 
opinion of the perceived role of close air support in future wars.  After the Korean 
war ended, the Air Force published AFM 1-2, “United States Air Force Basic 
Doctrine” promoting the principle of centralized air war and made the Joint 
Operations Center an all-Air Force agency.  The Army and the Air Force could 
not agree on a joint statement on the role of close air support.  Finally, in 1955, 
the Army announced that the principles in the Joint Training Directive of 1950 
were defective and the doctrine was void.22  As the Cold War heated up, Joint 
Close Air Support moved to the backburner as the United States prepared for 
nuclear war. 
5.    Vietnam 
After Korea, Air Force theory of air power was tailored to deal with the 
worst possible case (nuclear war), with the idea that any lesser situations could 
be handled with ease.  They trained high-performance, tactical fighter-bomber 
pilots for the multiple roles of counter-air, interdiction and close air support, 
making them ill-suited for unconventional war and vulnerable to the guerilla 
tactics encountered in Vietnam. 23  Because of this, between 1955 and 1959, the 
Army started building up their own air forces and in preparation for conventional 
warfare.  In 1961, the Army called for designated CAS units and special CAS 
aircraft leading to the recommendation in 1962 by the Howze Board (Tactical 
Mobility Requirements Board) for the Army to develop new air assault divisions.24 
Significant issues that blocked any sort of joint consensus on close air 
support before the outset of the war were 1) command and control, 2) 
quantitative measures to determine “adequate” CAS, 3) the Army’s highly mobile 
assault division, 4) specially designed CAS aircraft and the Army and the Air 
Force use of separate systems of air-ground control.25  Until 1965, strike 
missions characterized the air contribution to the war.  That year CincPAC 
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decreed the primary air mission in Vietnam to be close air support, launching the 
rapid evolution of CAS in Southeast Asia.  In 1966, the Joint Air-Ground 
Operations System (JAGOS) was established to alleviate the problem of 
separate systems of air-ground control in the Army and Air Force.26  JAGOS 
integrated the two systems of tactical air control, providing the foundation for the 
single air manager concept.  Though the Army and the Air Force continued to 
disagree on the role of air power in combat, ground commanders in all services 
were satisfied with the level of close air support they received.  Various aircraft 
were used for CAS and implemented innovative methods for delivering ordnance 
to targets on the ground.  The tactics and methods for conducting night and all-
weather CAS continued to evolve.     
6. Modern Conflicts 
Recent conflicts in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan have shown Joint Close 
Air Support successes and failures.  Since the evolution of Close Air Support in 
Vietnam, the Army and Air Force had grown apart.  Successes were forgotten 
and correct doctrine was not documented.  Differences in equipment, doctrine, 
attitude and outlook inhibited integration.  In Kosovo, continuing difficulties with 
successfully planning and integrating Close Air Support in a joint environment led 
to stove-piped and non-interoperable procedures.27  Debate among the service 
leaders about the effectiveness of air power alone to force capitulation continued. 
Though there were difficulties, technological advances were made.  
Operation Allied Force employed the first Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) as 
well as the first Predator UAVs in combat.28  In Afghanistan, Close Air Support 
proved to be a spectacular success when used by Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) against the Taliban.  Units of the CIA also utilized Close Air Support when 
they infiltrated in small teams.29  Armed Predators were used for the first time in 
battle.  When the U.S. conducted its first large-scale operation in Afghanistan, 
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Operation Anaconda, the services were not well-prepared to handle joint 
operations.  The Air Force refused to allow personnel other than their own 
controllers to call in strikes.  On top of this, they failed to provide enough 
Terminal Attack Controllers to Army units.  Many controllers called for strikes 
against the same targets and response time was a problem due to technical 
reasons and strict Rules of Engagement (ROE).30   
By the time the United States entered Operation Iraqi Freedom, advances 
were made in the area of Joint Close Air Support.  Ground operations were 
coordinated with air attacks against enemy ground forces in some areas with 
great success.  Sensor-fuzed weapons and cluster munitions using infrared 
sensing were introduced in combat.31  Though OIF showed outstanding 
examples of joint integration in some areas, in others it proved difficult to get 
aircraft with appropriate munitions on target quickly enough.  Weapon loads were 
often inappropriate.  Distrust between pilots and ground forces made target 
verification time long.32  These factors, good and bad, have provided us many 
lessons learned on which to build a successful Joint Close Air Support 
architecture. 
7.   Future of Close Air Support 
The application of Close Air Support in the future will depend on the 
conflicts in which the United States is involved.  Nation-states are no longer our 
biggest threat.  We face small cells of terrorists and insurgents operating from 
failed states.  Metropolitan areas have become our battlefield.  Joint operations 
are necessary to maximize the combat potential of our smaller, specialized 
forces.   
The National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy lay the 
foundations for future military application.  The National Security Strategy places 
an emphasis on protecting our security, laying foundations for future peace and 
continuing the fight against terror.  It outlines two pillars on which these beliefs 
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are founded; 1) promoting freedom, justice and human dignity and 2) leading a 
growing community of democracies by confronting challenges.  The National 
Military Strategy provides a guideline of ways and means to protect the United 
States, highlighting three priorities.  First, we need to win the war on terrorism.  
Second, we need to enhance our ability to fight as a joint force.  Finally, we need 
to transform the armed forces “in stride” by fielding new capabilities and adopting 
new operational concepts.  The National Military Strategy goes on to state that 
one of the most desired attributes of our strategy is a fully integrated, agile and 
decisive force.    It stresses an “Active Defense in Depth” by merging joint forces 
with other government agencies, international government organizations, non-
government organizations and multinational capabilities.   
Through the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, 
the need for updated and integrated doctrine and training has been highlighted.  
Technological advances made by one service must be implemented by all 
services.  Close Air Support has proven to be an effective means of fire support 
for Special Operations Forces and other specialized units.  As the conduct of war 
continues to change, enemies will operate outside of our Rules of Engagement 
and international law.  Our current threat is not that of a nation-state but of 
terrorists and insurgents who will be difficult to distinguish from the civilian 
population.  Smaller, specialized units and precision munitions will be needed to 
combat these threats. An effective system of Joint Close Air Support will provide 
them the heavy artillery and support needed to conduct successful operations.  
B. SERVICE DOCTRINE 
The Initial Capabilities Document for Close Air Support was directed by 
Joint Forces Command in 2004 to increase interoperability and joint 
effectiveness in the Close Air Support mission area.  It points out the deficiency 
of service doctrine in keeping pace with joint doctrine and highlights several 
instances in which fratricide was committed by Close Air Support aircraft.  The 
need for the services, the warfighting COCOMs and the Joint Staff to have one 
accepted CAS doctrine is emphasized by the ICD.  Once accepted, the doctrine 
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must be exercised and tested.33  This section will examine service doctrine and 
conclude by identifying gaps and shortfalls between service and joint doctrine. 
1.  Army/Air Force Doctrine 
The Army and the Air Force have partnered together to provide air power 
to ground forces since the inception of Close Air Support in World War I.  This 
partnership hasn’t always been a happy one.  Differences in attitudes between 
airmen and soldiers often caused strife and malcontent between the services.  
Early airmen thought the most effective use of air power was deep strikes against 
enemy centers of gravity and viewed Close Air Support as something to be 
performed only under extreme conditions.34  Soldiers on the ground have often 
thought of Close Air Support as a means of maintaining momentum for ground 
forces and filling temporary firepower shortfalls during intense combat.  The 
integrated force of the future will require the Army and the Air Force to work 
together as a cohesive unit.  Current CAS connectivity is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Army/Air Force CAS Connectivity (From JP 3.09-3) 
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Currently, the Army and Air Force exercise C2 over assigned forces 
through the Theater Air Control System (TACS).  The TACS provides the 
commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) the capability to conduct joint air 
operations.  The Air Component Commander exercises this control through the 
Air Force air and space operations center (AFAOC), the senior element of the 
TACS.35  The AFAOC allocates resources and tasks forces through air tasking 
orders (ATOs).  The air component coordination element (ACCE) is established 
by the AFCC and is the senior liaison element to interface with the joint force 
land component commander (JFLCC) or commander, Army forces. The wing 
operations center (WOC) provides C2 of unit forces and uses the ATO to 
generate sorties for the accomplishment of CAS missions.  The Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack 
Radar System (JSTARS) are the airborne C2 platforms supporting CAS.36  The 
control and reporting center (CRC) provide the COMAFFOR a decentralized C2 
execution capability connecting lateral and subordinate C2 nodes to the joint air 
operations center (JAOC).   
The coordination and execution of Close Air Support missions in support 
of Army operations is controlled at the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC).  
The ASOC processes Army requests for immediate Close Air Support.  The 
ASOC tasks on-call missions or diverts scheduled missions to satisfy approved 
immediate requests.37  The Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) is the 
senior Army airspace command and control element.  It is collocated with the 
AOC.  Preplanned CAS requests are forwarded to the BCD.   
At each level in the Army, there are elements which conduct, synchronize 
and coordinate close air support.  The Tactical Operations Center (TOC) plans 
and synchronizes all operations including planning and requesting CAS for unit 
missions.  The Tactical Command Post (TCP) is the approving authority for 
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immediate CAS requests or diversions of preplanned missions for the unit and 
the Fire Support Element (FSE) controls all fires and coordinates the use of 
airspace within the unit.38  Terminal control of Close Air Support is the final step 
in CAS execution.  There are both air and ground elements to accomplish this 
mission.  Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) are Air Force liaison elements and 
have the primary responsibility of terminal control.  Air Liaison Officers (ALOs), 
Terminal Attack Controllers (TACs), Forward Air Controllers (FACs), Tactical Air 
Coordinators (TAC[A]) are all members of the TACP and advise on CAS 
employment, control aircraft in close air support of ground troops and perform 
terminal control functions.  The Fire Support Team (FIST) coordinates ground fire 
support as well as CAS and naval resources through appropriate agencies at the 
company level and assist in the execution of CAS.39   
2. Navy/Marine Corps Doctrine 
Marine Corps Close Air Support doctrine is unique.  What sets it apart 
from other services doctrine (or lack thereof) is that Marines like it.  The doctrine 
and tactics work for them because it is Marines working with Marines.  Marines 
speak the same language and have the same mission.  Marine Air is an integral, 
irreplaceable part of the Marine Air-Ground Team and operates under the 
premise that Marines provide the best CAS for themselves.  
The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) team is task-organized to 
successfully perform its mission as a self-contained package of maneuver force, 
firepower, air support, lift and sustainment.40  The Navy integrates close air 
support by training with SEAL teams and Marine TACPs regularly and includes 
JCAS training in pre-deployment workups.  The amphibious force has figured out 
the importance of CAS and has successfully integrated it into their architecture.  
Current Navy/Marine Corps CAS connectivity is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Navy/Marine Corps CAS Connectivity (From JP 3-09.3) 
 
Naval CAS is conducted through the Naval Theater Air Control System 
(NTACS).  This system is comprised of the tactical air control center (TACC), the 
primary air control agency from which all air operations are controlled, the tactical 
air directions center (TADC), the control agency subordinate to the TACC and 
the helicopter direction center (HDC), an air operations installation from which 
control and direction of helicopter units are exercised.  The air traffic control 
section (ATCS) and the air support coordination section (ASCS) provide safe 
passage, radar control and surveillance and coordinate and control overall CAS 
employment, respectively.41 
The Marine air command and control system (MACCS) provides 
command and control to the MAGTF aviation combat element (ACE) 
commander.  The tactical air command center (TACC) acts as the operational 
command post for the ACE commander.  The Marine TADC is subordinate to the 
Navy TACC.  The Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) and the Direct Air 
Support Center (DASC) provide the same functions for the Marine Corps units as 
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the ATCS and the ASCS provide for Naval units.  The tactical air control party 
(TACP) is located within the ground control element (GCE) and provides a way 
for ground commanders to access MACCS to satisfy direct support requirements.  
A Forward Air Controller heads the TACP, which has two FAC parties that 
accompany front-line companies.  The FAC advises the ground unit commander 
on CAS employment while controlling CAS aircraft and maintaining radio comms.  
The TAC(A) and the FAC(A) provide airborne control for CAS missions.42  The 
TAC coordinates the action of combat aircraft engaged in close support of 
ground or sea forces.  The FAC controls close air support aircraft.  Coordination 
between the MACCS and the force fires coordination center (FFCC) and the fire 
support coordination center (FSCC) is required to integrate fire support assets 
and maneuver to achieve desired results from the air without affecting the 
scheme of maneuver on the ground.  When the services conduct amphibious 
operations, elements of both systems are used.  The Navy TACC will normally be 
responsible for controlling aircraft operations within the airspace until command 
and control of aircraft and missiles is phased ashore.43 
3.  Special Operations Forces Doctrine 
Special operations forces have a unique need for close air support 
because they are small, light units, deployed deep into hostile territory for a 
variety of missions including direct attack, search and recovery and special 
reconnaissance.  Their only means of heavy fire support comes from fast-moving 
close air support assets.  The ability of the individual services to provide them 
with the timely CAS they require hinges on the proper allocation of CAS assets to 
SOF in the planning process. 
Special operations fall under the control of the joint forces special 
operations component commander (JFSOCC).  The special operations liaison 
element (SOLE) coordinates, deconflicts and integrates SOF air and surface 
operations.  The SOLE processes all CAS requests in the JAOC.  The special 
operations command and control element (SOCCE) is the liaison for SOF units 
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when they are operating in support of a conventional joint or surface force.  
Special operations forces employ individuals from all the services who are JTAC 
qualified to perform terminal attack control.44  Special Operations CAS 
connectivity is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Special Operations CAS Connectivity (From JP 3-09.3) 
 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air 
Support, was revised in September, 2005 and lays the foundation for the 
successful integration of close air support at the joint level.  In the joint fighting 
force of the future, it will be necessary for services to train and adhere to joint 
doctrine.  There is no place for service bias in a successful air-ground battle.  
Some would argue that the Army is adverse to close air support because the 
perception is there that Army Commanders feel they must be able to win the 
battle without air, stemming from a long-standing distrust between the Army and 
the Air Force in the conduct of close air support.45    
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Historical doctrine has shown that close air support has not been a 
primary mission for the Air Force, preferring the more “glamorous” missions of air 
interdiction and strategic attack to the close air support to troops on the ground. 
This has done nothing to improve the CAS relationship between the Army and 
the Air Force.  The Navy has recently integrated JCAS missions into their air 
wing training schedules and every unit trains for the mission.46 The Marines have 
found a formula for success in the employment of CAS.  Marine pilots understand 
that their objective is to support the troops on the ground in the accomplishment 
of the overall mission. They put a premium on CAS and make it a priority.  The 
troops on the ground understand this so the trust is there.  Special Operations 
Forces rely heavily on CAS.  They travel light and depend on close air support to 
be there for them when they need it.  Close air support may not be a primary 
mission of the Army or the Air Force but when it is called for, these two services 
have to be willing to put their biases aside and integrate as one joint unit to 
accomplish the mission at hand.  
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III. ANALYSIS OF JCAS 
I take my system, my targeting pod and I make several passes over 
these vehicles to ensure they are in fact military vehicles. I roll in on 
two passes to get a close look, both with my eyeballs and with my 
targeting pod, IR (infrared) picture, and at this point it's about 25 
minutes into building the whole picture of the destruction that is 
falling from north to south into the town of Djakovica, and I make a 
decision at that point that these are the people responsible for 
burning down the villages that I've seen so far. I go in, put my 
system on the lead vehicle and execute a laser-guided bomb attack 
on that vehicle, destroying the lead vehicle.   —Text of recorded 
comments by the unidentified pilot of a NATO plane involved in the 
bombing of a convoy in Kosovo, from tape played during media briefing at 
NATO headquarters as transcribed by the Associated Press.47 
 Successful integration of Close Air Support between the services requires 
trusting relationships between key players in the planning process as well as the 
execution.  The need for detailed integration requires personnel from many 
different communities to work closely together to achieve superior situational 
awareness and optimal employment of Close Air Support assets in support of the 
troops on the ground.  Areas for deconfliction of CAS are shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Deconfliction of the JCAS Battlespace (From NTAMD CONOPS Brief) 
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Command and control, intelligence and air assets available are only a 
small number of the many factors Close Air Support planners must take into 
consideration when planning for CAS in a joint environment.48  Service bias also 
becomes an important consideration when bringing individuals together for CAS 
planning.  Doctrine from each service regarding the employment of Close Air 
Support sometimes conflicts.  This disconnect can lead to ineffective employment 
of high demand/low density air assets.   
JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) provides the 
doctrinal basis for Joint Close Air Support operations.  Its guidance is 
authoritative and takes precedence over service publications if conflicts arise.49  
For that reason, it is imperative that each service train to the tactics, techniques 
and procedures set forth in this doctrine and employ them on the battlefield.  
Successful adoption of these TTPs will lead to transparent integration of forces 
on the battlefield, regardless of service.  Unsuccessful adoption of the TTPs set 
forth in JP 3.09-3 will lead to ad hoc procedures, confusion, ineffective fires and 
worst case, fratricide.   
This chapter will examine case studies from recent conflicts in which CAS 
was used ineffectively and use those cases to determine which doctrine (if any) 
was followed and what effect doctrine may have had on the outcome of the 
mission.   For the purposes of this paper, the joint doctrine examined in each 
case will be the doctrine in effect for all three cases, the original JP 3-09.3, dated 
December 1995.  A discussion of the updated JP 3-09.3 will be included later in 
this chapter.  Cases involving fratricide and the bombing of non-military targets 
while conducting CAS will be examined to determine if the doctrine followed, 
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A. CASE STUDIES 
1. Incident on the Djakovica-Prizren Road, Kosovo on 14 April 
1999 
On 14 April 1999, NATO aircraft targeted a convoy of over 1000 Albanian 
refugees on the Djakovica-Prizren Road three times, killing approximately 
seventy-three civilians and reportedly injuring up to 100.  NATO aircraft were 
patrolling the area at an altitude of 15,000 feet, searching for Serb military forces 
conducting ethnic cleansing operations in the area.  The convoy was bombed 
three times, the F-16 pilots mistaking the civilian cars, tractors and carts for 
Yugoslav Army and Special Police troop carrying vehicles.   
NATO claimed that from the attack altitude, the vehicles in the convoy 
appear to be military vehicles.  There were reports of Serb forces using civilian 
vehicles for troop transport as well as intermixing military vehicles with civilian 
convoys along the road between Djakovica and Prizren.  The Combined Forces 
Air Component Commander (CFACC), General Michael Short, put out the 
guidance that military vehicles intermingled with civilians were not to be attacked.  
The UN tribunal investigating the incident stated they did not believe the civilians 
to be deliberately attacked although the substantial altitude and speed of the 
aircraft, the assumption that the intended targets were legitimate military targets 
combined with the fact that the pilot was also acting as the FAC(A) contributed to 
the attack.50 
This case study from the Kosovo campaign was used because, though it 
was not considered CAS in the traditional sense, it was termed CAS in Operation 
Allied Force by NATO planners.  The element of the CAS definition regarding 
“proximity to friendly forces” is irrelevant in this case because the incident 
described does not necessarily demonstrate a breakdown in the operational CAS 
architecture used by ground and air forces at the execution level but rather a 
breakdown in the process at the strategic level in the planning phase.  The 
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complexity of the civil-military relations in the target nomination and approval 
process contributed to friction between the U.S. military and NATO leadership. 
In Kosovo, airpower was used independent of ground forces to 
accomplish the strategic objective of ending the attacks on Kosovar Albanians.51  
It was argued that “the U.S. and NATO entered the conflict without a sound 
strategy” to prevent ethnic cleansing, achieve peace and provide a democracy 
for the Kosovar people.52  There was doubt that airpower alone would be enough 
to achieve the objectives.  Military planners were constrained in their target 
selection by pressure from NATO civilian leadership to avoid a prolonged conflict 
with Serb forces, limit collateral damage and maintain a favorable international 
opinion.53  The constraints in target selection caused military leaders to modify 
doctrine.   
Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3, Counterland states that “air superiority 
is required for CAS missions to concentrate on the task at hand. CAS is highly 
demanding of aircrew situational awareness, and proper execution of the CAS 
mission is not normally possible while searching for, or reacting to, enemy air 
threats. A strong counterair plan early in the campaign will therefore enable more 
effective close air support. Suppression of enemy air defenses is part of the 
counterair function and is perhaps the most important aspect of air superiority to 
the CAS pilot.”  Because of time constraints driven by the ethnic cleansing, there 
was not enough time for the suppression of enemy air defenses, causing pilots to 
drop bombs from higher altitudes and making identification difficult and collateral 
damage more likely.54  Lt. Col Paul Strickland, a member of the CAOC staff 
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during Operation Allied Force argued that the CAOC was unable to produce a 
timely and accurate ATO, caused by the absence of doctrinal guidance for the 
targeting and approval process.55 
By reviewing this incident, this thesis is using the practice in the field as a 
baseline to determine if there were doctrinal deficiencies that hampered the 
effective employment of JCAS.  Did JP 3-09.3 provide the guidelines necessary 
for the effective employment of CAS?   Since this was primarily an Air Force 
prosecution, Air Force doctrine was used as the basis for air operations during 
Operation Allied Force.  There was no NATO doctrine regarding the procedures 
for target selection.  Would JP 3-09.3 have provided the required guidelines to 
build the operational architecture necessary for the effective employment of air 
assets during Operation Allied Force?  The following discussion attempts to 
answer this question. 
It is the intent of this thesis to determine the enduring themes encountered 
in this incident that hampered the effective and efficient employment of command 
and control to air forces during air operations in Kosovo.  The original version of 
JP 3-09.3, approved in December 1995, outlines the considerations associated 
with CAS employment planning in the joint environment.  It stresses the 
importance of phasing to assist commanders in defining requirements in terms of 
forces, resources and time.  It highlights weather as a significant factor impacting 
the effectiveness of CAS aircraft and stresses that planners at every level 
understand the impact of weather on the mission.  The air strikes in Operation 
Allied Force were interrupted several times due to weather, as April is typically a 
month of rainfall in the region.   
JP 3-09.3 also highlights the importance of considering the element of 
time in coordinating events and massing fires.  It states that there must be 
adequate time available to ensure mission success.  In the Balkans, operations 
were compressed by the urgency to stop the ethnic cleansing Serb forces were 
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conducting on the ground.  The original version of JP 3-09.3 listed the nine 
conditions for effective close air support as 1) air superiority, 2) suppression of 
enemy air defenses, 3) target marking, 4) favorable weather, 5) prompt 
response, 6) aircrew and terminal controller skill, 7) appropriate ordnance, 8) 
communications and 9) command and control.  In Operation Allied Force, at least 
four of the nine conditions were not fully satisfied.   
Finally, JP 3-09.3 outlines the responsibilities of the Joint Force 
Commander to establish guidance and priorities for CAS in the CONOPS, or 
campaign plans.  In this operation, the Joint Force commander was not granted 
full autonomy over target selection.  After Djakovica-Prizren Road, the leaders of 
France, Britain and the U.S. demanded target veto authority.56  The requirement 
for targets to be approved through the President severely affected the timeliness 
of the strikes.   
In this operation, the restrictions imposed on military commanders by the 
civilian leadership from the coalition countries severely impacted the target 
selection process.  The effectiveness of airpower was hampered by the 
requirement for consensus among the coalition leadership in this incident and 
throughout the entire operation.  JP 3-09.3 did not provide required guidelines to 
build the operational architecture necessary for effective CAS, although, had it 
been followed, it may have provided more effective guidance to the CAOC staff 
for targeting guidance and approval. 
2. Incident in the Shahikot Valley, Afghanistan on 2 March 2002 
On 2 March 2002, CWO2 Stanley Harriman, an Army Green Beret, was 
killed as Operation ANACONDA was launched in the Shahikot Valley region of 
Afghanistan by gunfire from an AC-130H (SPECTRE) gunship.  The AC-130 was 
providing escort and reconnaissance for Harriman’s ground convoy when it broke 
contact to respond to calls for CAS from other ground units.  CWO2 Harriman’s 
unit separated from the main convoy to proceed to a pre-planned position.  When 
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the AC-130 returned to the convoy, the crew of the gunship miscalculated their 
own position relative to the ground and believed CWO2 Harriman’s unit to be 
enemy vehicles and personnel positioned to attack the convoy.  They requested 
permission to engage, received permission and fired multiple rounds into CWO2 
Harriman’s unit, killing Harriman and two Afghan military personnel and injuring 
three U.S. and 14 Afghan soldiers.57 
An investigation into this incident was ordered by the Commander of 
USCENTCOM, General Tommy Franks, after he noticed that Harriman’s unit was 
radioing that they were under fire at the same time the AC-130 was engaging the 
“enemy” on another radio circuit.  The results of the investigation found that the 
crew of the AC-130 had misidentified their location based upon visual 
observation of ground reference points after experiencing equipment problems 
with their navigation system.  Based on this inaccurate fix, they were observing a 
grid point that was north of the grid point they were requested to observe by the 
convoy.  They spotted Harriman’s element within that grid point vicinity and 
identified it as enemy forces positioned to attack the main convoy.  They 
requested permission to engage and received it, based on their inaccurate fix of 
their own position.  When Harriman’s element reported receiving mortar fire, the 
AC-130 broke off to support the element and moved to the North, to the location 
they believed Harriman to be.58 
A number of questions come into play when studying this incident, the 
details of which are still classified.  Who was controlling the aircraft?  How many 
terminal attack controllers were attached to the convoy and with which elements 
were they located?  It was reported that every 12-man Special Forces A team 
had a controller, as did SEAL teams, members of the 10th Mountain Division and 
CIA operators.  All told, there were said to be 37 terminal attack controllers in the 
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Shahikot Valley.59  One report stated that CWO2 Harriman was listening on the 
radio as the AC-130 described the “enemy” convoy.  He heard the AC-130 
describing what they saw, how many vehicles in the convoy, and Harriman 
radioed over to the other controller: ‘You are describing us.  You’re describing 
us.’60  If this is the case, it stresses the importance of reliable communications 
between all units, air and ground, as well as the significance of having a sound 
communications plan that ensures the deconfliction of all radio nets.   
The crew of the AC-130 did not face disciplinary action for their mistake 
and it is not the intent of this thesis to place blame on any person or crew 
involved in this incident.  By reviewing this instance of fratricide, the practice in 
the field is being used as a baseline to determine if there were doctrinal 
deficiencies that hampered the effective employment of JCAS.  Did JP 3-09.3 
provide the guidelines necessary for the effective employment of CAS?  The 
questions presented above highlight the shortcomings of JP 3-09.3 as the sole 
doctrine when conducting JCAS.  It is unclear from which doctrine the forces in 
the Shahikot Valley were operating at the outset of Operation Anaconda.  What is 
clear is that the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Close Air Support 
alone, published in December 1995, did not provide the architecture necessary 
for the successful integration of forces in the employment of JCAS in this 
incident. 
The architecture for CAS for special operations forces is outlined in 
general terms in JP 3-09.3.  The problems encountered in this incident did not 
seem to be problems with the command structure but more problems with the 
control structure, specifically, communications and navigation.  JP 3-09.3 states 
that “CAS-capable units and aircrews will need radio frequencies and call signs 
for the airspace control agencies and the terminal controllers they will need to 
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contact during the course of their missions.”61  If the report of Harriman hearing 
the description of the “enemy” and calling to another controller that they were 
identifying his element, the two primary players in this incident did not have the 
means available to communicate effectively.  The navigation error by the AC-130 
crew was the source of the confusion in this incident and was found to be the 
primary cause of the accident.  The use of terrain features is the technique the 
AC-130 crew used to identify their position because of the problems they had 
been having the entire mission with their navigation systems.  This technique is 
recommended by JP 3-09.3 as a method to identify control points (in this case 
terrain features, which they misidentified) for the deconfliction with other fires.  
The pub stresses the importance of basic pilotage and navigation skills in CAS 
due to the “fog of war, “ stress, confusion and other factors that may complicate 
the tactical situation for CAS aircrews.   
In this incident, it appears that many of these factors contributed to an 
honest mistake that led to this tragic incident.  Though the AC-130’s reported 
position was wrong, the question remains, why wasn’t Harriman’s unit identified 
as a “friendly?”  JP 3-09.3 specifically addresses night CAS using AC-130 
gunships because of their ability to provide accurate support for extended 
periods of time to ground units in a night time environment.  It highlights the 
GLINT (gated laser intensifier) as part of the LLLTV (low light level television) as 
an alternate source of IR illumination with the capability to illuminate and identify 
IR GLINT tape worn by friendly ground forces.  A drawback to GLINT is that it 
highlights the aircraft to enemy forces using night vision devices. 62  It was 
reported that CWO2 Harriman’s element was wearing the GLINT tape on their 
persons and their vehicles.63  If that was the case, it is assumed in this incident 
that the crew of the AC-130 was not utilizing their GLINT technology.  The 
original version of JP 3-09.3, published in September of 1995, did not require 
AC-130 aircraft to utilize this technology and cited other methods for identifying 
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friendly positions as beacons, IR or visible light strobes, chem lights and other 
light sources.  It is unclear whether Harriman’s element or the AC-130 were 
utilizing any of these techniques.  JP 3-09.3 states that marking friendlies is the 
least desirable method of providing a target mark, although in this case it may 
have prevented the incident. 
The cause of this incident, according to the press release by CENTCOM 
in November 2002, was the AC-130’s inaccurate fix of their own position.  The 
press release stated “after ensuring that there were no friendly forces at the grid 
point they believed they were observing, the AC-130 received permission to 
engage the ‘enemy’.”64   
Because of their ability to provide accurate CAS in low-light and adverse 
weather conditions, basic tactics, techniques and procedures for CAS are 
provided for AC-130 aircrews in JP 3-09.3.  The position of friendly forces is 
stressed in every phase of CAS for the AC-130.  Upon arrival, the AC-130 crew 
is to contact the terminal controller for ingress instructions.  It seems as though 
the AC-130 crew was in contact with the command center but were they in 
contact with the forces on the ground?  According to JP 3-09.3, the AC-130 crew 
will also make every effort to establish radio contact to speed acquisition of 
friendly positions and authenticate the terminal controller.  A detailed threat 
description, marking of friendly locations, identifiable ground features and the 
ground commander’s willingness to accept “danger close” (ordnance delivery 
inside the 0.1% probability of incapacitation) are mandatory briefing items for the 
AC-130.  In the fast-paced, fluid environment in the Shahikot Valley during 
Operation Anaconda, all friendly locations may not have been marked.  For the 
attack phase, the first consideration for the AC-130 is to identify friendly position.  
JP 3-09.3 stresses that “the AC-130 crew will maintain radio contact with the 
ground forces at all times during firing.”65  In this case, it can be assumed that 
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the AC-130 crew was in contact with forces on the ground, although it does seem 
as though CWO2 Harriman’s element was not one of them. 
In this operation, the lack of communications between forces on the 
ground (specifically CWO2 Harriman’s element) and the AC-130 was a primary 
contributor to this incident.  The effectiveness of the close air support provided by 
the AC-130 was hampered by the inaccurate fix of their own position, coupled 
with the “fog of war.”  Although CWO2 Harriman’s element was positioned 
according to the scheme of maneuver, they were still confused with enemy 
forces.  JP 3-09.3 did provide guidelines for the employment of close air support 
in this instance but those guidelines were not specific enough to build an 
effective operational architecture.  Lack of communications is a major theme in 
our ability to effectively and efficiently employ C2 to provide close air support in 
support of the Ground Combat Commander.  A primary factor in this incident was 
the inability of the aircrew to communicate with Harriman’s element and identify 
them as friendly.  Devices that connect ground and air forces with the same 
picture and allow them to share photos, images and electric pen markings in near 
real time will be important tools for effectively employing close air support.66 
3. Incident near An Nasiriyah, Iraq on 23 March 2003 
On 23 March 2003, at least ten U.S. Marines were killed and four injured 
near An Nasiriyah by a U.S. A-10 when it targeted their company and made 
multiple firing passes against their position.  The Marines were a part of a 
Battalion assigned the mission of securing two bridges over the Euphrates River 
and the Saddam Canal.  The Battalion consisted of Bravo Company, the Forward 
Command Post, Alpha Company and Charlie Company.67  Bravo Company led 
the offensive across the southern bridge then maneuvered off the main road to 
avoid the threat of enemy fire in “Ambush Alley” and got stuck in muddy 
conditions in the eastern section of the city.  The Forward Command Post also 
got stuck.   
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Due to communications problems throughout the Battalion, Charlie 
Company mistakenly thought Bravo Company had moved straight up Ambush 
Alley and seized the northern bridge.  Charlie Company crossed the southern 
bridge and attempted to maneuver through Ambush Alley to the northern bridge 
when they began to take heavy fire.  Charlie Company proceeded to the northern 
bridge and seized it while at the same time, taking the lead.  The Charlie 
Company Commander called the Battalion Commander, located with the 
Forward Command Post to notify them of their position.  After a lull in enemy fire, 
Charlie Company again began taking heavy enemy fire.68  At the same time, the 
Air Officer in the Forward Command Post called the FAC, located with Bravo 
Company, requesting CAS to combat enemy forces attacking their location.   
A two-ship formation of A-10’s were called to engage targets north of the 
canal.  The A-10’s spotted a damaged Charlie Company amphibious assault 
vehicle (thought to be an enemy vehicle) and reported it to the FAC, who saw the 
smoke and verified it was in the target area.  The FAC was unable to see the A-
10s or a specific target.  The Bravo Company Commander unsuccessfully 
attempted to verify friendly forces’ positions and, based on the scheme of 
maneuver, identified his company to be the lead element and believed only 
enemy forces were ahead.  The FAC informed the A-10s there were no friendly 
forces north of the bridge and they were cleared to engage.69 
Many factors contributed to the clouded situational awareness in this 
incident including deviations from the planned scheme of maneuver, the urban 
environment and problems with communications links.  The central cause of the 
incident was found by the Friendly Fire Investigation Board to be the FACs 
decision to engage the A-10 on Charlie Company under Type 3 CAS control on 
his (the FAC’s) authority.  This was a direct violation of the Battalion 
Commander’s standing order and the CAS Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for 
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Operation Iraqi Freedom that approval authority for Type 3 control of CAS assets 
rested only with the Battalion Commander.  From the CONOPS:  
— Type 1 control requires the JTAC [Joint Terminal 
Attack Controller, also known as the FAC] to visually acquire the 
attacking aircraft and the target under attack.  Type 1 is the default 
method of control. 
—  Type 2 Control occurs when either visual acquisition 
of the attacking aircraft or the target at weapons release is not 
possible, or when attacking aircraft are not in a position to acquire 
the mark/target prior to weapons release/launch (night, adverse 
weather, high threat tactics, high altitude and standoff weapons 
employment). 
—  Type 3 Control is used when the tactical risk 
assessment indicates that CAS attacks impose low risk of fratricide.  
When commanders authorize Type 3 control, JTACs grant a 
“blanket” weapons release clearance to an aircraft or flight 
attacking a target or targets which meet the prescribed restrictions 
set by the JTAC.70    
FACs are required to broadcast the type of control in use upon aircraft 
check-in.  The FAC in this incident recalled telling the pilots of the A-10 they 
would be operating under Type 3 control but neither pilot remembered hearing 
the call.  It was the belief of the investigating board that the A-10 pilots in this 
incident thought they were under Type 2 control.   
When this incident took place in 2003, JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures for Joint Close Air Support, did not make any 
distinction between Type 1, Type 2 or Type 3 control of CAS assets.   It stated 
that “aircraft check-in procedures are extremely important to the flow of 
information between airborne assets and control agencies.”71  The check in 
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briefing format did not require the aircraft or the terminal controller to identify 
which type of control they were using.  The standardized briefing form, the “Nine-
Line Briefing” was used for all threat conditions though the mission information 
and sequence could be modified to fit the tactical situation.  The eighth item in 
the nine-line brief is “location of friendlies”.  In this incident, the location of 
friendlies could not be ascertained due to communications problems between the 
Bravo Company Commander and Charlie Company.  Based on the information 
available concerning the scheme of maneuver, the Bravo Company Commander 
believed his element to be the lead element and cleared the target ahead of him 
for fire.  This incident of fratricide might have been avoided if the FAC attached to 
Bravo Company had followed the Battalion Commander’s Standing Orders and 
requested approval authority for Type 3 control of the A-10s.  He would have 
learned the location of the Charlie Company and would not have been given the 
authority to employ the A-10s under Type 3 control.   
It is interesting to note that all the companies involved in this engagement 
had FACs attached with the exception of Charlie Company.  Had Charlie 
Company had a FAC, this incident might have been avoided.  It can be 
reasonably assumed that he either would have had control of the A-10s himself 
and could have relayed the position of Charlie Company, been monitoring the 
guard channel and heard the call for fire in his area and interjected or, at the very 
least, once the attack commenced, he could have called for an abort.  According 
to JP 3-09.3, the FAC “controls CAS aircraft and maintains radio communications 
with assigned CAS aircraft from a forward ground position to aid target 
identification and reduce the potential for fratricide.72  Charlie Company was the 
rear element of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines so it can be assumed that a FAC 
was not assigned to this company because the scheme of maneuver never had 
them in the lead.  
By reviewing this incident, the practice in the field is being used as a 
baseline to determine if there were doctrinal deficiencies that hampered the 
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effective employment of JCAS.  Did JP 3-09.3 provide the guidelines necessary 
for the effective employment of CAS?   In this case, though the three types of 
aircraft control used in the employment of CAS were not yet defined by JP 3-
09.3, they were defined by the CONOPS as well as the Battalion Commander’s 
Standing Orders.  Doctrine outlining the procedures to be used was promulgated 
and understood but miscommunications, confusion about the location of 
friendlies due to “fog of war” and lack of reliable communications links hampered 
the ability of the FAC, the Company Commanders and the Air Officer to 
effectively coordinate the CAS strikes.   
JP 3-09.3 did not provide required guidelines to build the operational 
architecture necessary for effective CAS and those gaps were filled by the CAS 
CONOPS for Operation Iraqi Freedom using guidance from different sources 
including JP 3-09.3, USCENTCOM CONOPS for Joint Fires and the USCENTAF 
CAS CAO SOP.  In September of 2005, a revision to JP 3-09.3 was issued.  
Some of the key changes incorporated into the revision included expanded 
guidance on the uses of CAS, updated conditions required for effective CAS, a 
detailed discussion on the three types of CAS terminal attack control and a 
discussion of urban CAS.  An analysis of the changes will be discussed in the 
next section. 
B. UPDATE OF JP 3-09.3 
In September 2005, a revision of JP 3-09.3 was published, five years past 
its mandated revision date.  This revision included numerous updates to 
incorporate new concepts and technologies and innovations that have been 
realized in training and combat operations, many of which likely stem directly 
from the three case studies previously discussed.73  For the purposes of this 
paper, the following paragraphs will examine only those changes included in the 
updated JP 3-09.3 that relate to those case studies as well as the research 
questions identified in Chapter I.   
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The first change listed in the summary of changes to the updated JP 3-
09.3 is a definition and discussion of the position of joint terminal attack controller 
(JTAC).  In two of the three case studies examined earlier, the persons 
responsible for terminal control functions had a significant role in the outcome.  In 
the original doctrine, the position of JTAC did not exist.  The persons responsible 
for performing terminal control were forward air controllers (FACs), enlisted 
terminal attack controllers (ETACs) and forward air controllers (airborne) 
(FAC(A)s).   
In the updated doctrine, a JTAC is defined as “a qualified (certified) 
Service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat 
aircraft engaged in CAS and other air operations.  A qualified and current JTAC 
will be recognized across Department of Defense as capable and authorized to 
perform terminal attack control.”74  The position of JTAC incorporates the 
positions of ETAC and FAC into one.  The 2003 JCAS Action plan listed the 
standardization of the JTAC position across the services as its second priority.  
This initiative resolves the conflict between the services over whose controllers 
can control JCAS assets.75  By establishing the position of JTAC, extensive “talk-
ons” directing the air asset to the target, can be avoided when terminal 
controllers from all services are trained the same and, consequently, are 
speaking the same language.   
The updated JP 3-09.3 also provides a detailed discussion of JTAC to 
combat operations center/tactical operations center coordination.  It highlights the 
necessity for JTACs and COC/TOC elements to coordinate their efforts prior to 
each CAS engagement, stressing issues such as types of terminal attack control 
in effect and which JTAC provides terminal attack control as key to the 
achievement of the supported commander’s objective for CAS.  The incidents in 
Afghanistan and Iraq both involved situations in which this coordination was 
ineffective.  By providing a standard definition of the JTAC and outlining the 
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coordination process between the JTAC and the COC/TOC, the updated JP 3-
09.3 offers improved guidance for the effective employment of CAS assets. 
Another issue presented in the case study of the Marines at An-Nasiriyah 
was the confusion between the FAC and the A-10 pilot as to which type of 
terminal attack control they were operating under.  The updated JP 3-09.3 
provides a detailed discussion on the three types of CAS terminal attack control.  
The original publication did not.  The advances in GPS-equipped aircraft and 
munitions, laser range finders and digital system capabilities have provided 
JTACs additional tools to maximize the effectiveness of CAS.  Three types of 
terminal attack control have been identified to offer the lowest level supported 
commander the latitude to determine which type of control will best accomplish 
the mission. 76   
Type 1 control is used when the JTAC must visually acquire the 
attacking aircraft and the target for each attack. Analysis of 
attacking aircraft geometry is required to reduce the risk of the 
attack affecting friendly forces. Language barriers when controlling 
coalition aircraft, lack of confidence in a particular platform, ability to 
operate in adverse weather, or aircrew capability are all examples 
where visual means of terminal attack control may be the method of 
choice.   
Type 2 control is used when the JTAC requires control of individual 
attacks and any or all of the following conditions exist:  JTAC is 
unable to visually acquire the attacking aircraft at weapons release, 
JTAC is unable to visually acquire the target, the attacking aircraft 
is unable to acquire the mark/target prior to weapons release.  
Examples of when Type 2 control may be applicable are night, 
adverse weather, and high altitude or standoff weapons 
employment.   
Type 3 control is used when the JTAC requires the ability to 
provide clearance for multiple attacks within a single engagement 
subject to specific attack restrictions. Like Type 1 and 2, only a 
JTAC can provide Type 3 control. During Type 3 control, JTACs 
provide attacking aircraft targeting restrictions (e.g., time, 
geographic boundaries, final attack heading, specific target set, 
etc.) and then grant a “blanket” weapons release clearance 
(“CLEARED TO ENGAGE”). Type 3 control does not require the 
JTAC to visually acquire the aircraft or the target; however, all 
targeting data must be coordinated through the supported 
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commander’s battle staff. The JTAC will monitor radio 
transmissions and other available digital information to maintain 
control of the engagement.77 
Specific procedures for each type of control are outlined followed by step-
by-step examples of how the type of control is conducted.  Finally, the updated 
publication identifies the conditions in which each type of control is to be used 
and gives examples of situations in which each type of control may be applicable 
as well as emphasizing considerations for employing them.  The JTAC is 
required to provide the type of control as part of the CAS brief.  The guidance 
presented in the revised JP 3-09.3 is very specific with regard to the three types 
of terminal attack control and, if the procedures outlined are followed, leaves no 
room for confusion in the execution of terminal attack control. 
Another change in the revision of JP 3-09.3 updates the conditions 
required for effective CAS.  In the original publication, the conditions required for 
effective CAS were:   
—  Air Superiority 
—  Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) 
—  Target Marking 
—  Favorable Weather 
—  Prompt Response 
—  Aircrew and Terminal Controller Skill 
—  Appropriate Ordnance 
—  Communications 
—  Command and Control 
In the updated version, the conditions required for effective CAS are: 
—  Effective Training and Proficiency 
—  Planning and Integration 
—  Command, Control and Communications 
—  Air Superiority 
—  Target Marking and Acquisition 
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—  Streamlined and Flexible Procedures 
—  Appropriate Ordnance 
—  Favorable Weather 
Many of the new conditions stem directly from incidents where CAS was  
ineffective and resulted in fratricide.  In the case studies from Afghanistan and 
Iraq, lack of effective training and proficiency could have been a factor in each 
incident.  JP 3-09.3 states that the “training should integrate all of the maneuver 
and fire support elements involved in executing CAS.  Maintaining proficiency 
allows aircrew and JTACs to adapt to rapidly changing battlespace conditions.” 78 
In all three scenarios the battlespace changed rapidly and more effective training 
may have prevented the friendly fire incidents.  Command, Control and 
Communications was a major factor in all of the case studies.  According to JP 3-
09.3: 
CAS requires an integrated, flexible C3 structure to identify 
requirements, request support, prioritize competing requirements, 
task units, move CAS forces to the target area, provide threat 
warning updates, enhance Combat Identification procedures, etc.  
Accordingly, C2 requires dependable and interoperable 
communications between aircrews, air control agencies, JTACs, 
ground forces, requesting commanders, and fire support 
agencies.79   
In Kosovo, the C2 structure was ad hoc from the strategic down to the 
tactical level.  In Afghanistan, the C2 structure was not flexible enough to identify 
requirements, request support or prioritize competing requests.  Finally, in Iraq, 
communications were not dependable between the C2 players.  Had this 
requirement been satisfied in any of the three cases, there would have been a 
better outcome.  Streamlined and Flexible Procedures allow a commander to 
rapidly change targets, tactics or weapons in a dynamic battlefield.  Techniques 
for improving responsiveness include using forward operating bases near the 
area of operations, placing aircrews in alert status and placing JTACs to facilitate 
continuous coordination with ground units, comms with aircraft and observation 
                                            
78 United States, JP 3-09.3, 2005, I-6. 
79 Ibid, I-7. 
44
of enemy locations.80  In Kosovo, targets and tactics were already changing 
rapidly.  Had more streamlined and flexible procedures been in place, the 
situational awareness of the pilots conducting the strikes may have been 
heightened and the instances of targeting civilians might have been minimized. 
The changes incorporated in the updated JP 3-09.3 represent significant 
steps forward in JCAS.  This doctrine “presents options the joint force 
commander (JFC) can employ when planning and executing close air support in 
joint operations” and is authoritative. 81  Commanders must still provide additional 
directives to supplement the successful employment of CAS. The new version 
provides an improved guideline for commanders to frame their plans and 
procedures which, if implemented properly, will result in a more successful, 
wholly integrated joint force. 
C. DOCTRINAL PROBLEMS 
The case studies outlined above, along with the comparison of the 
updated JP 3-09.3 to the original version illustrate the need for further 
examination of Joint Close Air Support doctrine.  Joint Forces Command has 
created J8, the Joint Requirements and Integration Directorate, to standardize 
training and procedures for JCAS along with other joint missions.  The JCAS 
Executive Steering Committee (ESC)  was created in October 2002 to resolve 
interservice issues.  The JCAS ESC published a JCAS Action in 2003, 
incorporating fifteen action items to fix the shortfalls in service and joint training, 
equipment and the misapplication of JP 3-09.3.82  These fifteen items were 
prioritized into tiers.  The first five issues were: 
1)  Joint Task Analysis for JCAS 
2)  Joint Terminal Attack Controller (Ground) 
3)  Forward Air Controller-Airborne (FAC (A)) Standardization 
4) Joint Integrated Training Plans 
5) Live Sortie/Artillery Resource Plan83                                             
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The five issues in the first tier were designated as a priority.  Many of 
these issues have already been addressed.  In 2005, the JTAC Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA) was signed by the services as well as continuing the JCAS 
standardization progress by signing a JFAC MOA the same year.   These two 
MOAs will standardize training and certification requirements for the five 
accredited schools training terminal attack controllers.84  USJFCOM has also its 
Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) which simulates combat scenarios over 
an integrated network using virtual, live and constructive environments.  The first 
of these integrated exercises leading to initial operating capability for JNTC  
focused on JCAS.85 
USJFCOM directed the next five issues to be resolved as soon as 
feasible.  These issues were: 
 6)  Joint CAS Exercises 
 7) JCAS Training Simulation Support 
 8) Advanced JCAS Concepts Experimentation 
 9) Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) in JCAS Operations 
 10) Integrated CAS Architectures and Interoperable JCAS Systems86 
 Progress has been made on several of these issues.  In January 2004, the 
Western Range Complex JNTC Horizontal Training Event 04-1 was the first 
horizontal joint training exercise conducted throughout the United States, 
involving the participation of all four military services.87  The event focused on 
JCAS, incorporating different services in the same scenario to interact with one 
another to achieve a common goal.88  Three other integrated events in 2004 led 
to initial operating capability for JNTC.   
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Armed UAVs have already been used in direct support of troops on the 
ground and, as their technology matures, they may prove to be a vital element in 
the CAS mission area.  Joint Close Air Support architecture has been updated in 
the revised version of JP 3-09.3 to reflect the changes that emerged from 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Joint Battle Management Command and 
Control (JBMC2) is currently in development to provide a baseline JTF HQ Core 
architecture against which JTF Functional Component Commanders (FCC) can 
map their own views.89  The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is an Army led 
program fielding a software programmable radio system, compatible in units 
across the services.90  Initial deliveries of the radios is expected in 2008. 
 Despite the progress made by JFCOM and the JCAS ESC, problems 
continue to exist with JCAS doctrine.  JP 3-09.3 provides a guideline for the 
operational architecture necessary for effective CAS.  Commanders often do not 
like to adhere to doctrine because great respect is given to leaders who are agile 
in combat.91  Because of the authoritative rather than directive nature of doctrine, 
tacticians often deviate from doctrine based on approval by the commander.92  
Joint doctrine accounts for what we know and should be used as a guideline 
when planning joint missions.  Is the doctrine written in such a way as to be 
useful?  Is it clear enough as to where to get needed guidance?  These two 
questions can be debated.  What is clear is that, until all forces and services 
understand and adhere to the same doctrine, we will continue to experience 
mistakes on the battlefield. 
 To utilize JP 3-09.3 as an effective process model, forces must 
understand that doctrine is the standard required for effective training, 
management and support.  Individuals bring specific experience and expertise to 
the watch floor but the tactics, techniques and procedures outlined in doctrine will                                             
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provide a baseline for effective operations.  Doctrine also provides a structure for 
measurement of the effectiveness of our operations.  If we are not adhering to 
that doctrine and are using ad hoc procedures on the battlefield, we will be 
unable to improve existing doctrine and learn from our mistakes.   Finally, 
doctrine takes time and effort to produce.  Often doctrine does not keep pace 
with emerging technology however, its guidelines provide enough flexibility for 
the commander to deviate from it, depending on the circumstances.  When 
forces have a firm grasp on doctrine, they are able to incorporate those 
deviations yet adhere to the basic tenets of the doctrine.  The key to effective 
JCAS is the C2 architecture from the top to the bottom.  Effective, network-
centric joint communications systems must be developed and incorporated into 
this architecture.  Until then, all services must use the tactics, techniques and 
procedures outlined in JP 3-09.3 as their guideline when conducting close air 
support in a joint environment.  Figure 5 shows the current JCAS connectivity. 
 
Figure 5. Joint Force Close Air Support Connectivity (From JP 3-09.3) 
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D. CONCLUSION 
 The integration of Joint Close Air Support has sometimes been called the 
most difficult joint mission.  Different services’ components, aircraft, forces and 
fires are all coming together to fight a close ground battle.93  Because of this 
difficulty, successful trusting relationships at all levels in this detailed process are 
extremely important.  The Command and Control Tenets listed in Joint Pub 0-2, 
Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) serve as a framework for developing joint 
doctrinal concepts.  They are: 
 — Clearly Defined Authorities, Roles and Relationships 
 — Information Management 
 — Implicit Communication 
 — Timely Decisionmaking 
 — Robust Integration, Synchronization, and Coordination Measures 
 — Battle Rhythm Discipline 
 — Responsive, Interoperable Support Systems 
 — Situational Awareness 
 — Mutual Trust94 
 Many of these problems encountered in the case studies outlined above 
are in direct conflict with these tenets.  In the Kosovo conflict, authorities, roles 
and relationships were not clearly defined, leading to delays in timely decision 
making and a lack of mutual trust between decisionmakers.  In the incident in 
Afghanistan, there was a lack of implicit communication and situational 
awareness.  Finally, problems with information management coupled with 
coordination measures that were lacking and deficient situational awareness led 
to the tragedy in Iraq.  The original Joint Doctrine for CAS, used over the last ten 
years, did not address most of these tenets.  The revised version has come a 
long way in identifying shortfalls and making corrections to them, enhancing our 
ability to fight as an effective joint force.  The doctrine will never be perfect, but it 
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accounts for what we know and as a guideline, it lays the groundwork for 
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IV. FUTURE WEAPONS AND INTEGRATION OF NSFS INTO 
JCAS 
 As the joint battlespace becomes more complex and weapons systems 
continue to advance, fire support from surface ships may become a requirement 
for the successful sustainment of forces operating ashore.  Naval Surface Fire 
Support (NSFS) is defined by JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, as “fire provided by Navy surface gun, missile, 
and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving 
the commander’s objectives.”  JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious 
Operations, characterizes the primary mission of NSFS as destroying enemy 
forces at a defended landing beach as well as isolating a landing area to weaken 
coastal defenses.  NSFS has been an integral component of U.S. littoral and 
amphibious operations since the Iowa class battleships were introduced during 
WWII.  The twenty-four mile range of their 16-inch guns coupled with their thick 
armor gave these battleships increased survivability in high-threat operations.95  
With the decommissioning of the last Iowa-class battleship in 1992, a void was 
left in NSFS capabilities.  In 1994, the Navy developed a two-phased plan to field 
a replacement NSFS capability.  “In the near-term to midterm, it would modify the 
capability of 5-inch guns on existing destroyers and cruisers, and develop 
extended-range guided munitions for the modified 5-inch gun.  In the far term, it 
would field a sufficient number of new destroyers fitted with an even-longer-range 
advanced gun system and ultimately a very-long-range electromagnetic gun or 
‘Rail Gun.’”96  In this chapter, NSFS and future NSFS weapons systems will be 
examined to determine their contribution to the JCAS mission area. 
 As stated above, NSFS is an integral component of littoral and amphibious 
operations.  Eighty percent of the world’s capital cities are located in the littorals, 
along with three-quarters of the world’s population.  The 2004 draft of the Major 
Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept stresses urban warfare as a key 
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battlefield in future combat operations and assumes that we will face enemies 
who operate outside the rule of law and are difficult to distinguish from non-
combatants.97   
 Because more than three-quarters of the world’s urban areas are located 
in the littorals, it is reasonable to assume that Naval Surface Fire Support will 
contribute significantly to these combat operations.  The decommissioning of all 
Iowa-class battleships left a significant gap in our NSFS capability.  The thirteen-
mile range of the MK 45 5-inch/54-caliber gun is insufficient to provide effective 
fire support for the initial stages of amphibious operations.  The Navy is currently 
working with the Marine Corps to address the overall capabilities needed for 
NSFS.98  A major hurdle with developing systems for NSFS is cost.  The time, 
money and modernization costs associated with reactivating battleships is not 
feasible.  The fielding of the Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM) system 
for use in upgraded 5-inch guns on current destroyers and cruisers has been 
delayed, as has the fielding of an advanced gun system for the new DD(X) 
destroyer.99  Finally, a sufficient number of DD(X) destroyers to close the NSFS 
gap will not be available until 2018.100   
 Despite these drawbacks, recent Navy analysis found that surface 
combatants are still the best gapfiller during the early stages of an amphibious 
operation based on:  
 —  Immature theater 
 —  Lack of air superiority 
 —  Capacity 
 —  Number of people placed in danger 
 —  All weather 
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 —  Capability (24 hours/7 days per week) 
 —  Cost 101 
As a result, the Navy must continue to fund research and programs that will 
produce the capabilities required for effective NSFS in the near term.    
A. NSFS WEAPONS SYSTEMS 
For Naval Surface Fires to remain a relevant component of amphibious 
and littoral operations, programs and systems currently under development must 
proceed as planned and remain on schedule.  This section will discuss the NSFS 
systems and platforms currently in progress that will help close the existing gap 
in NSFS capability. 
The Tomahawk land attack missile is an all-weather ship-launched missile 
capable of attacking a variety of fixed targets in a high-threat environment.  The 
Tomahawk uses a variety of systems for guidance including GPS, terrain contour 
matching (TERCOM) and digital scene matching area correlation (DSMAC), 
providing the surface Navy a proven deep-strike weapon capable of pinpoint 
accuracy.102  An upgrade to the Tomahawk land attack missile is the Tactical 
Tomahawk, an improvement that allows the weapon system to be an element of 
the network-centric force envisioned by the Pentagon.103 
The Tactical Tomahawk, developed by Raytheon, is the only naval surface 
weapon that may provide a near-term capability for surface ships to contribute to 
the JCAS mission area.  It uses its connectivity to multiple sources including 
UAVs, satellites, soldiers, aircraft, tanks and ships to find its target and is able to 
send data back and forth between the platforms.  The updated missile is capable 
of reprogramming in mid-flight and redirecting to one of 16 pre-designated 
targets or any other GPS coordinate up to 1000 miles from its firing unit.  Its long 
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loiter time and on-board TV camera provide it the ability to perform battle 
damage assessment and send data back to commanders. 104   
The Tactical Tomahawk entered service in 2004 with initial production 
expected to be completed by December 2006.  The Navy awarded Raytheon a 5-
year contract, worth up to $1.2 billion to replenish the Tomahawk inventory.  The 
Block IV missiles cost approximately half the price of the Block III variant and will 
have a fifteen-year warranty and recertification cycle, compared with the eight-
year warranty and recertification cycle for the Block III.105 The updated Tactical 
Tomahawk Weapons Control System (TTWCS) will be employed on cruisers, 
destroyers and submarines, allowing commanders the mission planning function 
aboard the firing unit.  This ability will reduce the weapon system reaction time by 
speeding up the tactical mission planning process.106  The rapid mission 
planning process coupled with the long loiter time over the target area are two 
key factors that will allow the Tactical Tomahawk to make a significant 
contribution to the Joint Close Air Support mission. 
Another surface fires technology currently under development is the 
Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM).  The ERGM is a 5-inch, rocket- 
assisted, high energy propelling charge shot from a MK 45 Mod 4, 5-inch/62-
caliber gun.  The MK 45 5-inch gun will be able to fire all conventional 5-inch 
ammunition in the current inventory.  The ERGM provides Navy surface ships 
with a precision strike capability from a range of up to sixty-three NM, allowing 
them to contribute to expeditionary operations and the Joint land battle.  The 
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projectile uses GPS/INS for guidance that is resistant to jamming, allowing the 
round to function in a heavy electronic countermeasure environment.107  
The ERGM program began in 1994, with the first projectiles scheduled to 
enter service in early 2005.  Though several successful flight tests have been 
conducted, difficulties with the guidance system, design, motor and gun barrel as 
well as contract modifications have delayed the fielding of the system until 2011, 
ten years later than originally planned.  The ERGM system will be employed on 
Arleigh-Burke-class destroyers, starting with DDG-81, the USS Winston S. 
Churchill, as well as possibly modifying Ticonderoga-class cruisers with the new 
gun, though no money has been appropriated for this conversion.  If this program 
is to significantly contribute to the NSFS mission and subsequently the Joint 
Close Air Support Mission significant progress will need to be made in fielding 
this system.  The setbacks and delays experienced by this program have left a 
significant gap in our surface fires capability for at least the next five years. 
The retirement of the battleships left a void in our surface fires capability.  
To fill that void, the Navy is fielding the DD(X), a future class of destroyers with a 
mission focus on land attack.  The DD(X) will feature a variety of new systems 
tailored for the NSFS mission.  First, an integrated power system will provide 
power for propulsion, ship services and weapons systems from the same 
electrical source, allowing large amounts of power to be reallocated to combat 
systems.108  Future weapons systems such as electromagnetic rail guns would 
be able to use that power to fire at targets with ranges of over 200 miles, using 
GPS guided projectiles at six times the speed of sound.  Rail gun rounds could 
provide missile-like capabilities without requiring powders or magazines at a 
much lower cost than a missile such as the Tomahawk land-attack missile or the 
Tactical Tomahawk.109  One analysis compared the 200-mile volume of fires 
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capability of a single hypersonic naval rail gun to the ordnance delivery capacity 
of a carrier air wing of F/A 18s and found that in the first eight hours of conflict, a 
single rail gun could deliver twice the payload and three times the energy to ten 
times as many fixed aim points as carrier aviation.110  This capacity would enable 
the rail gun and NSFS to be a relevant participant in Joint Close Air Support.  A 
Mach 7 rail gun could deliver a payload 100 NM in approximately 2 minutes.111  
The most significant challenges to the development of large-scale rail gun 
technology are the gouging and wear that occur during the acceleration phase of 
the projectiles to hypervelocities as well as the development of electric support 
systems capable of meeting the power requirements of more than 60 
megawatts.112  This technology is currently under development and may be 
fielded as early as 2011.   
To support its primary mission of land attack, the DD(X) will have two 
Advanced Gun Systems (AGS).  The AGS is 155mm caliber gun mounted within 
a conventional turret arrangement.  The turret allows for the entire 62-caliber 
length barrel to be enclosed inside the turret housing when not firing.  
Ammunition supply and operation will be fully automated.113  The AGS will use a 
rocket-assisted Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), a highly accurate, 
GPS-guided munition with a range of up to 100 NM. The AGS will have a multiple 
round simultaneous impact capability that will allow multiple rounds to be fired 
simultaneously at targets up to 75 percent of the guns maximum range.  The 
payload of the LRLAP will be 3 times that of the ERGM.114  Currently the AGS is 
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only scheduled for installation on the DD(X) and no plans have been made to 
retrofit current ship designs with the new gun. 115 
Finally, to execute these fire support options, current Naval surface 
platforms as well as DD(X) will use the Naval Fires Control System (NFCS).  
“NFCS will automate shipboard land-attack battle-management duties and 
incorporate improved land-attack battlefield digitization.  NFCS will be 
interoperable with joint C4ISR systems, providing the mission planning and fire-
support coordination functions needed to support the extended ranges and 
precision-strike and accuracy capabilities mandated for new fire support 
systems.”116  Lockheed Martin has been awarded a contract to integrate the 
Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control System, the Land-Attack Missile Fire 
Control System and Naval Fires Control System into one component called TLN 
(Tomahawk/Land/Naval).  This C4I system will be interoperable with the Army 
and Marine Corp’s Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and 
the Air Force’s Theater Battle Management Core System through the Automated 
Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) to provide real-time situational 
awareness in a net-centric environment across the entire joint force.117 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have the potential to make a significant 
contribution to the CAS mission.  Currently they are used primarily by the Navy 
for surveillance and intelligence gathering, although recently have provided direct 
support for troops on the ground in theaters such as Afghanistan and Iraq.  The 
first use of an armed UAV outside a major combat theater was in 2002, when a 
CIA-controlled Predator firing a Hellfire missile was used to kill six Al-Qaeda 
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terrorists in Yemen.118   The armed UAV brings many advantages to today’s 
battlefield.  First, they are able to provide up to 10 hours of endurance from 
ranges of up to 1,000 nautical miles.119  Second, they have sensors allowing for 
the detection and cataloging of targets for attack by other platforms during all-
weather conditions.120  Finally, the UAVs ability to accelerate to “fighter-like” 
speeds provide rapid responsiveness.121  The Navy is currently working in 
conjunction with the Air Force on the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems 
program (J-UCAS).  “The objective of the J-UCAS program is to develop, 
demonstrate and transition an affordable, lethal, survivable, and supportable 
unmanned combat air system to meet the operational needs of the Air Force and 
Navy.”122  This system is scheduled to have its first flight in May of 2007.  If this 
technology stays on track and on schedule, UAVs may fill the gap in surface fire 
support sooner than any other Naval surface weapon. 
B. OUTLOOK FOR NAVAL WEAPONS INTEGRATION INTO JCAS 
As stated above, the Navy is lagging in its development of effective 
surface fire support systems.  With the void left by the decommissioning of the 
Iowa-class battleships, Navy surface ships currently do not have the capability to 
contribute much to the land battle.  The near to mid-term solution of a modified 5-
inch gun capable of firing extended range guided munitions has been delayed 
until 2011.  The far-term solution of fielding a sufficient number of DD(X) 
destroyers to close the gap left by the battleships will not be realized until at least 
2018.   
To satisfy this requirement now, the Tactical Tomahawk and the armed 
UAV may be the best option for the Navy if it is to remain a relevant element of 
the joint battlefield.  With the Tactical Tomahawk’s all-weather capability as well 
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as its ability to be programmed with up to sixteen GPS targets make it an 
excellent option for support to forces on the ground.  Its long loiter time and 
connectivity with a number of different platforms give commanders options in a 
fast-paced, changing battlespace.   The relatively low cost of the TacTom make it 
a realistic option for future use in JCAS.  If the Tactical Tomahawk is to become 
a viable option in the JCAS mission area, airspace issues will need to be 
addressed in JCAS doctrine.  Currently, there is no mention of the Tactical 
Tomahawk in JP 3-09.3 but if it is to be used, it must be incorporated into the 
planning phase of JCAS, taking into account such things as time of day, weather 
conditions, terrain, communications and other CAS assets available.  Depending 
on these factors, the Tactical Tomahawk may prove to be a viable option for 
troops on the ground. 
Along with the Tactical Tomahawk, the armed UAV is the only other 
system that will allow the surface Navy to contribute to the land battle in the near 
term.  It is scheduled to be operational within the next five years.  Its ability to act 
as a reliable sensing platform, its high speeds and long loiter time are crucial for 
the network-centric force of the future.  J-UCAVs will not only be able to provide 
support to the warfighter through information relays, real-time video and laser 
designating capability but also provide direct support to troops on the ground with 
payloads of up to 20 small diameter bombs.123  JP 3-09.3 discusses UAVs but 
only in the context of airspace deconfliction, providing surveillance and target 
designation.  There is no mention of UAVs as a combat aircraft so future 
iterations of JP 3-09.3 may need to include them as an execution aircraft rather 
than simply a support platform. 
Within the next ten years, when the NSFS gap is filled, it will be necessary 
for the revision of JP 3-09.3 to incorporate naval surface fires into joint CAS 
doctrine.  JTAC training and education will need to be revised to include calling in 
support from naval surface vessels.  When Extended Range Guided Munitions, 
the Advanced Gun System, rail guns and Tactical Tomahawk become a reality 
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on surface ships, issues such as terminal attack control procedures, airspace 
deconfliction and planning considerations must be addressed.  NSFS will most 
likely be included in the deliberate planning phase and key concepts to consider 
will be: commander’s intent, terrain, location of the enemy and the timeliness, 
accuracy, mass, flexibility and desired effects of the weapon.  If these conditions 
can be satisfied reliably by a naval surface weapons system, NSFS will have re-
acquired its place as part of the larger land battle.   
To integrate NSFS into the JCAS architecture, future iterations of JCAS 
doctrine must provide a flexible yet standard process in which to incorporate 
surface fires.  The key to successful integration will be a reliable, network-centric 
C2 architecture for communications between all pertinent joint elements.  This 
communications architecture will provide the basis for successful execution of the 
JCAS mission.  Devices that connect ground, air and surface forces with the 
same picture and allow them to share photos, images and electric pen markings 
in near real time will be important tools for effectively employing close air support 
from any platform.124  Once forces are able to reliably communicate regardless of 
service, platform or location, the integration of NSFS into this architecture could 
potentially be seamless. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Historically, the integration of Close Air Support has been difficult.  
Differences of opinion in the application of air power in support of forces on the 
ground have been prevalent since the first U.S. aircraft dropped bombs against 
enemy fortifications in the closing battles of World War I.  The Air Force has 
traditionally viewed Close Air Support as a strategic instrument of force while the 
Army has traditionally viewed it as a tactical one.  These differences have been 
at the heart of the problem of successfully integrating the CAS mission.  The 
need for relevant, integrated doctrine has never been greater than it is today. 
The National Military Strategy has placed a priority on fighting as a joint 
force and identifies a fully integrated, agile and decisive force as one of our most 
desired attributes.  With the battlefield changing from large, conventional war to 
small, urban battles, specialized units using CAS for their heavy fire power will be 
the standard fighting force.  With budget cuts, attrition and the short turnaround in 
deployment cycles, there is no place in current CAS doctrine for service bias.  It 
is important that the services pay close attention to joint doctrine because of its 
increasingly authoritative nature.  All services must participate in the joint debate 
and doctrine must be in the best interests of integrating them into one fighting 
force and not become a power struggle between them.   JCAS must be linked to 
the larger land battle and JCAS doctrine must be tailored to “grow” with emerging 
technologies and weapons systems.  Future doctrine must be updated to include 
Naval Surface Fire Support capabilities and the development of the Joint Tactical 
Radio System must be monitored to ensure the seamless transition to an 
effective, net-centric force.  Devices that connect all forces with the same picture 
and allow them to share photos, images and electronic pen markings in near real 
time will be important tools for effectively employing close air support and an 
important addition to future joint doctrine.125 
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By studying incidents in which JCAS was used ineffectively, themes which 
hamper our ability to effectively employ CAS have been identified.  The inability 
of leaders to agree on target selection in the planning phase or to simply 
consider the conditions for effective CAS listed in JP 3-09.3 were the primary 
themes that contributed to the targeting of civilians on Djakovica-Prizren Road in 
Kosovo.  An ineffective C2 architecture was the primary theme the led to the 
fratricide of CWO2 Stanley Harriman in the Shahikot Valley in Afghanistan.  
Finally, lack of situational awareness, confusion over the type of terminal control 
in which they were operating as well as communications problems were the 
themes contributing to the fratricide of at least ten U.S. Marines in An Nasiriyah, 
Iraq in 2003.  By examining these case studies and identifying these themes, a 
foundation can be laid for the revision and implementation of future JCAS 
doctrine. 
In the future, combat operations will be more complex and the successful, 
detailed integration of JCAS within the services will be crucial.  If doctrine is to 
keep pace with technology, it must remain flexible yet relevant.  Areas of future 
study of JCAS doctrine will need to identify the limitations of urban battlespace, 
as urban warfare will be our primary battlefield.  Current doctrine addresses the 
urban CAS environment but only to provide very general guidance on target 
acquisition, munition effects, terminal attack control and Supression of Enemy Air 
Defenses requirements.  Command and Control architecture in an urban 
environment will need to be specifically addressed because of the limitations 
imposed upon communications in metropolitan areas, a problem highlighted in 
the incident in An Nasiriyah.  The revised JP 3-09.3 discusses C2 in urban terrain 
but simply states that “a detailed, flexible and redundant C2 plan is essential.”126  
For the doctrine to be effective, more detailed guidance must be given for the 
creation of that detailed, flexible and redundant C2 plan. 
Another area of future study will need to be the integration of future smart 
weapons and UCAVs into joint doctrine.  Currently, UAVs are identified as 
                                            
126 United States, JP 3-09.3, 2005, V-48. 
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surveillance and intelligence platforms but in the future, may be a primary 
provider of CAS to forces on the ground.  Terminal attack control procedures for 
these UCAVs will need to be addressed as well as methods in which to identify 
friendlies.  Weapons such as the Tactical Tomahawk will need to be incorporated 
into the tactics, techniques and procedures for CAS when ground troops are able 
to program in target coordinates to redirect the weapon to their desired targets.  
There are no terminal attack control procedures currently outlined for this type of 
control and it is something that will need to be addressed once the Tactical 
Tomahawk is fully operational on the battlefield. 
Finally, history has shown that we are not good at documenting and 
implementing lessons learned.  Future study in the development of a joint system 
for tracking and implementing lessons learned, contributed by any member of the 
process from the lowest echelons to the highest, may be useful in developing 
future doctrine.  Such a system would store lessons learned in a common, joint 
database, available in a simple, standard format to those charged with revising 
doctrine, making the process much less complicated.  The revision of JP 3-09.3 
was approved in September 2005, ten years after the original doctrine was 
released and five years after the first revision was mandated.  A system for 
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